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Abstract 
The paper analyses the European Research Area policy (ERA) from the innovation perspective. The 
Lisbon Treaty gives the Union the objective of free circulation of researchers, scientific knowledge 
and technology. The five ERA initiatives implement the ERA policy on the basis of voluntary 
cooperation. The ERA and innovation are linked through the business sector R&D investment. The 
economic value of the ERA comes from accelerated cross-European knowledge spillovers reducing 
the cost of inventing. In general, important obstacles hinder the knowledge spillovers making them 
largely intra-national. These obstacles arise due to the incentives in providing and sharing knowledge 
and to costs of capturing knowledge spillovers. Funding of knowledge from national budgets and 
uncertain benefits from knowledge circulation across the heterogenous member states complicates 
situation further.  
The analysis of Joint Programming and Better Careers and Mobility initiatives reveals multiple 
sources of obstacles to cross-European knowledge spillovers. Weak incentives in the member states 
and limited possibilities at the EU level block the implementation of ERA. In this constellation, the 
ERA initiatives need to support openness and competition in publicly funded research and universities 
as well as better models of scientific management to guarantee highest scientific quality. Accelerated 
(ERA) knowledge spillovers require extended and dynamic markets.  
Keywords 





This paper looks at the European Research Area (ERA) from an innovation perspective. Today, the 
European research area policy has a prominent role in the Lisbon Treaty
1; the Union has been given 
the objective of free circulation of researchers, scientific knowledge and technology. The so-called 
five ERA initiatives
2 on the basis of partnership between the Commission and the Member states are 
already in action to implement ERA (ERA Green Paper 2007).  
This paper addresses the question as to why Member states do not show a stronger commitment to 
implement the ERA policy in a situation of ever pressing economic problems. One obvious reason is 
that the economic value of the ERA policy and the individual ERA initiatives are not yet well 
understood. In order to answer these questions we examine the role of the European Research Area 
(ERA) in contributing to the European innovation performance. Also the conditions and incentives 
slowing down the implementation of the ERA initiatives become visible.  
The ERA and innovation are linked through business sector R&D investment which is the basis for 
analysing the influence of the free circulation of knowledge on the innovation activities in Europe. The 
economic value of ERA comes from accelerated cross-European knowledge spillovers which reduce 
the cost of inventing. The business sector R&D activities look for the best quality knowledge in the 
world as basis for innovating. 
However, important obstacles slow down the cross European knowledge spillovers making them 
largely intra-national. These obstacles arise to the most part endogenous due to the incentives in 
providing and sharing knowledge with an economic value and due to costs of capturing knowledge 
spillovers. The European specificity of the funding of knowledge from national budgets complicates 
the situation further. In addition, benefits from cross-border knowledge circulation (reduced cost of 
inventing) are not only uncertain but also differ across the heterogeneous member states. 
The analysis of the Joint Programming and the Better Careers and Mobility initiatives shows that 
multiple sources of obstacles to cross-European knowledge spillovers and the related incentive 
problems are indeed present. The multiple and interacting sources of obstacles makes the EU level 
support to ERA implementation very complex. The traditional instruments of financial compensation 
are not effective. The R&D cooperation literature shows that the effectiveness of the traditional 
financial compensation (asymmetric partners) is weak while the EU budget also constrains the 
possibilities. Instead – to unblock the situation of weak incentives at the member states level and of 
limited possibilities at the EU level - the ERA initiatives should support more openness and 
competition in publicly funded research institutes and universities as well as efficient models of 
scientific management to guarantee highest scientific quality. Finally, the market cutting effects of 
knowledge spillovers call for European measures to increase the market size and dynamism for 
innovative products and services in Europe and access to markets outside of Europe.  
The insights from this analysis contribute to European research and innovation policy making, in 
particular to the ERA's link to innovation and business sector R&D including the 3 % objective. They 
can also serve for a better implementation of the challenge-oriented "Europe 2020 Strategy".  
                                                 
*  I would like to thank Professor Elena Carletti and Professor Ramon Marimon at the EUI for their useful and constructive 
comments on this paper. My warm thank goes also to Thomas Bourke at the EUI Library. This paper expresses my 
personal views gained during my research activity as EU Fellow at the EUI and are not the official ones of the European 
Commission. Any mistakes are of course mine. 
1  OJ 2008, The Treaty of the European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.  
2  Joint Programming, Careers and Mobility, Research Infrastructure, Sharing knowledge and International cooperation. Marianne Paasi 
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The paper starts with an analysis of R&D expenditure in Europe, Japan, USA and some emerging 
countries in Asia showing the well known, permanent research and innovation gap vis-à-vis the USA – 
and possibly an emerging one with Asia. ERA policy is designed to reduce fragmentation in research 
and through this reverse the European research gap. The objectives of the five ERA initiatives are 
described and how the policy making mode (New Partnership) is organized. There is a short review 
about the recent academic discussion on the European research policy. 
Chapter 2 develops an analytical basis for analyzing the ERA’s contribution to innovation. The link 
between the ERA and European innovations comes from business sector R&D investment. The partial 
analytical literature on supply side determinants of business sector R&D and the effects of knowledge 
spillovers on the cost of inventing is presented. At the same time, demand side is equally important for 
business sector R&D decisions. The literature on incentives for sharing economically valuable 
knowledge and information (adverse selection, moral hazard, transaction costs) and the cost of 
knowledge spillovers explain the obstacles to knowledge spillovers. Recent literature shows that 
business sector R&D seeks to capture knowledge of from the highest academic quality. 
In the 3
rd Chapter it will be shown that the benefits of the ERA initiatives on innovation arise from 
the accelerated knowledge spillovers from publicly financed knowledge (research and higher 
education) to the cost of inventing. It will be shown that the obstacles and weak incentives to 
knowledge spillovers known from the economic literature as well as the financing of knowledge from 
national budgets explain also the weak voluntary cooperation for ERA initiatives. Two of the ERA 
initiatives (Joint programming and Better Careers and Mobility) will be discussed in terms of 
incentives for voluntary cooperation and European knowledge spillovers.  
The Chapter 4 discusses how the EU level policy can support the implementation of Joint 
Programming and Careers and Mobility initiatives in spite of weak incentives and limited EU financial 
possibilities. The R&D cooperation literature shows that the effectiveness of the traditional financial 
compensation (asymmetric partners) is weak. As the recent academic literature discusses, the ERA 
initiatives should support more openness and competition in publicly funded research and universities. 
Efficient models of scientific management need to guarantee competition for highest scientific quality. 
The literature on business sector R&D investment and knowledge spillovers shows that an 
acceleration of ERA knowledge spillovers needs to be complemented by extended and dynamic 
product and services markets.  
1. European research and innovation challenges and policies  
1.1. European research gap dynamics 
In the post war period the EU-27 invests permanently less in research than the USA giving rise to a 
permanent research gap. In particular, the business sector is investing much less in R&D in Europe 
than in the USA. Business sector R&D reflects directly the innovation activities in the business sector 
and therefore the gap indicates to the relative weak innovation efforts in Europe (see Figure 1 and 
Table 1). The public sector R&D is only slightly lower in the EU-27 in comparison to that of the USA.  ERA from the Innovation Perspective: Knowledge Spillovers, Cost of Inventing and Voluntary Cooperation 
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 Business Enterprise Expenditure on R&D (BERD)  Government Intramural Expenditure on R&D (GOVERD)
 
Source: DG Research 
Data: Eurostat 
However, there is a considerable diversity across the Member states in terms of their public and 
private research investment. While in 2007 the total average R&D expenditure per capita in EU-27 
accounts to 462,4 Euro per capita it comes up to 1310,3 Euro per capita in Sweden and to 18,2 Euro 
per capita in Bulgaria. The Swedish per head R&D efforts are even higher than those of the USA 
(902,6 Euro per capita in 2007).  
The European research, technology and innovation gaps and the associated relatively weak 
economic performance of the EU are not new phenomenon. The permanently lower R&D investment 
implies a (relatively) lower cumulative knowledge stock in Europe in comparison to the USA. 
Applying knowledge based growth theory (for example see Grossman/Helpmann 1991; Romer 1990) 
in particular the low business sector R&D investment is not contributing to the knowledge stock and 
the productivity of future R&D efforts. This is a problem because the overall knowledge stock and its 
growth (through R&D investment) are important sources of knowledge for innovation and long term 
growth both for individual Member states and for the EU as a whole. The relative smaller European 
knowledge stock and lower spillovers is accompanied with locally separated (national) knowledge 
stocks and (intra-national) spillovers. Therefore, the relatively slow overall accumulation of 
knowledge and innovation investment matters for all individual EU countries. The persistent research 
gap vis-à-vis the USA and diversity across member states on the other hand is an indication for 
important obstacles to accelerated knowledge spillovers in Europe.  
Today, this situation is confronted with the very high increase of R&D activities in the emerging 
countries like China (218%) and Korea (93%) in 2000 – 2007 (see Table 2). In particular, business 
sector research is increasing even faster with 284% and 98% respectively in contrast to EU-27 19% 
and USA 12%. These extremely high growth rates are of course based at low initial levels but in China 
the increase of business sector R&D in this period corresponds in absolute numbers 40,3 billion PPS at Marianne Paasi 
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2000 Euro which is much larger than in the total EU with 19,6 billion PPS at 2000 Euro and even in 
the USA with 21,6 billion PPS at 2000 Euro. These figures can be taken as an indication that the 
business sector R&D worldwide orientates towards the economically dynamic regions in creating 
innovations and contributing to its knowledge stock and future R&D investment. 
The levels and increases in publicly funded research (GOVERD) are much lower. In Japan publicly 
funded R&D expenditure even decreases in the period 2000 to 2007. Again the absolute increase of 
publicly funded research is the highest in China while the level is considerably lower (Tables 1 and 2). 








Public sector R&D,  
Euro 
EU 27  229,0  146,7  28,9 
USA 272,2  196,5  29,5 
Japan  110,1    85,8   8,6 
China    35,6    25,7   2,9 
Korea    24,6    18,7   6,8 
Source: New Cronos. China, excl. Hong Kong.  



























 GERD  BERD  GOVERD GERD  BERD GOVERD
EU 27  20,1  19,2  10,4  32,2  19,6  2,4 
USA 16,1  12,4  22,0  37,7  21,6  5,3 
Japan 26,1  38,4  -0,01  22,5  23,5  -0,08 
China 218,3  283,8  94,5  51,7  40,3  7,0 
Korea 92,5  98,3  68,6  14,3  11,3  1,4 
Source: New Cronos. China, excl. Hong Kong.  
1.2. European research policy governance: Member states and the EU level 
The individual Member states are the main actors in research and innovation policies in Europe. The 
governments address their national issues in research, innovation and science policy including their 
involvement in the EU level, international and intergovernmental R&D cooperation. In 2007, the 
governments of the 27 member states funded basic research (with 29 billion Euro), research in higher 
education (with 41 Billion Euro) and business sector R&D (with 10.0 Billion Euro) while the EU level 
funding instruments are rather very low.
3 The corresponding figures for the USA were 29,5 billion for 
public funded research, 23,8 billion for research in higher education and 1,9 billion for business sector 
research.
4 
The EU level is responsible for the implementation of the multi-annual Research Framework 
Programme (FP), coordinating national research policies and the ERA policy (Lisbon Treaty). The 
                                                 
3  The EU level does not provide direct financial subsidies or tax incentives to the business sector R&D. 
4  These figures do not include other types of supporting instruments such as taxes. ERA from the Innovation Perspective: Knowledge Spillovers, Cost of Inventing and Voluntary Cooperation 
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multi annual Research Framework Programme is financed from the EU budget and the present FP7 
has a budget of around 54 billion Euro running for the period 2007 - 2013.
5 The FP subsidies cross-
national, cross-sectoral R&D cooperation through competitive calls, cross-national mobility grants of 
researchers, networking and today also basic research on the basis of individual grants (European 
Research Council (ERC)) as well as support for R&D in Small and Medium sized Enterprises.  
Other EU level funding instruments for research and innovation are the Competitiveness and 
Innovation Programme (CIP) and Structural funds where the first has provided an average annual 
funding for research and innovation for 2000-2006 4,4 Billion euro to be increase to almost 15 billion 
euro for 2007-2013 (Key Figures 2009). The use of Structural Funds is in the responsibility of the 
Member states and regions. The EU level is called for guaranteeing an efficient governance between 
its funding instruments (EC 2010; Paasi 2008). 
The small size of the EU level funding is striking when compared with the USA federal level 
efforts. Alone in 2006 it comes up to 94 billion US$ in 2006 (making 28% of all funding in the USA 
(NSF Science and Engineering Indicators 2008). Or in terms of research fields, US National Institute 
for Health (NIH) on medical research alone counts to 28.4 billion US$ each year which is roughly the 
half of the overall 7 year FP budget (Eucaoua 2009).  
Today, the Treaty on European Union integrates a new element about “strengthen its scientific and 
technological bases by achieving a European research area in which researchers, scientific knowledge 
and technology circulate freely…”
6. Yet, the Lisbon Treaty explicitly points out the independency of 
Member states in European research policy and the requirement to respect the fundamental 
orientations and choices of the Member states (see TFEU Art. 4 ( 3).  
The new Treaty strengthens also the role of the EU in research policy coordination (TFEU Art. 
181(2)) in using the Open method of coordination in the context of the 3% Barcelona objective and the 
involvement of CREST (Comité de la recherché scientific et technique) aiming to stimulate and 
coordinate national R&D policies in the context of the Lisbon strategy; today in the context of "the 
Europe 2020 Strategy".  
Academic discussion on EU research policies  
Since the Sapir report (2002) and the launch of the Lisbon Strategy to support knowledge based 
economy (2000) it has been recognised that the structure and size of the EU budget needs to reflect 
policy objectives and challenges of the EU. In particular, in order to support the Lisbon strategy it is 
argued that the level and share of knowledge policies needs to be increased in relation to Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP). Arguably, an adequate design of expenditure and revenues and their 
structure towards knowledge investment in the EU budget can make a difference on European growth 
dynamism (Sapir et al 2002). Theoretically, research policy at the EU level is justified by positive 
externalities due to cross-border spill-overs from research (having the characteristics of a public good 
and economies of scale in the R&D activities) (see Korkman 2005; Pisani/von Hagen 2003).
7 
It has also been argued that the EU level funding instruments for research themselves (because of 
low quantity) do not make a difference to the rate and direction of technological progress but the EU 
has other policy areas which matter for innovation and R&D investment such as regulations or 
                                                 
5  The present FP7 has 4 Specific Programmes: Cooperation, People, Ideas, Capacities.  
6  Articles 179-190: Art 179 “The Union shall have the objective of strengthening its scientific and technological bases by 
achieving a European research area in which researchers, scientific knowledge and technology circulate freely with view 
of the competitiveness of the European industry.  
7  The assignment criteria depends on the assumption about the characteristics of public goods and the externalities 
(costless, immediate, equally distributed). In this paper we will see that the knowledge spillovers differ importantly from 
these characteristics (see below). Marianne Paasi 
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standards
8 (Pavitt 1998). Already the Aho report 2006 (initiating the Broad based innovation policy) 
and discussions in some Member states (Finland and Germany for example) have recognised the 
broader view on innovation rather than the research perspective alone. Recently, the increasing 
importance of horizontal policies for research and innovation policy when countries and Europe 
approach the technological frontier has been pointed out (Aghion et al. 2006).  
In contrast to the so-called European paradox (European scientific inputs and outputs are relatively 
high but the problem lies in the weak transformation to innovations), it has now been recognised that 
the EU has an important problem also in the quality of its science (Marimon/Graca Carvalho 2008a 
and 2008b; Bonaccorsi 2007). The underlying reason is the low competition in academic research due 
to institutional regulations forming barriers between the national science systems, in particular in 
publicly financed research and universities in Europe. The national science system lack on openness 
and competition while coordination and opening at the EU level can bring important benefits for 
quality (Marimon et al. 2008a; Marimon et al 2008b; Pavitt 1998).  
Intensive discussions about the orientations of European research policy have taken place in the so-
called Knowledge for Growth group
9 and various expert groups. These groups have laid down 
important principles for the European research (and innovation) policy towards solving economic, 
societal and environmental challenges (along with the quantitative goal of 3% research intensity) and 
based on a new ecology of the research system (with reformed actors and linkages) (Georghiou 2008). 
The ERA expert group “The role of community research policy in the knowledge-based economy 
(European Commission 2009) reinforces the orientation of European research and innovation policy 
towards economic, societal and environmental challenges while taking strongly into account the 
globalisation of the innovation environment and the ongoing economic crisis.  
Indeed, a certain progress is visible along the lines of academic discourse: The budget of FP7 was 
increased (although less than originally proposed by the Commission), the ERC based on high 
autonomy – expanding EU R&D policy on basic research - has been launched, broad based innovation 
policy has been launched and, in particular, the ERA to support knowledge circulation in cooperation 
with the Member states’ research policies is integrated in the Lisbon Treaty. Today, the European 
research and innovation strategy is strongly challenge oriented in areas such as environment, energy, 
financial crisis and social matters. 
1.3. European Research Area (ERA) policy: ERA initiatives and new partnership 
The idea of a European Research Area (ERA) was launched already 2000 (EC COM (2000) 6 final) 
and clearly takes the position that the fragmentation of European research and the absence of a real 
European research policy are responsible for Europe’s relatively weak research, innovation and 
economic performance (Banchoff 2002). Also today the success of ERA is seen as critical for Europe's 
innovation and economic performance but also for achieving EU policy objectives, in particular for 
Barroso’s political programme “Europe 2020 Strategy” for 2010-2014 (EC 2010).  
The ERA’s central idea concerning free circulation of knowledge or the establishment of an 
“internal market for research” needs concrete measures of implementation which are included in the 
ERA Green Paper 2007 in terms of five concrete initiatives (EC COM(2007 161).
10 
                                                 
8  Also in Lisbon Treaty Art. 179( 2):.. “to exploit the internal market potential to the full, in particular through the opening-
up of national public contracts, the definition of common standards and the removal of legal and fiscal obstable to that 
cooperation.” 
9 See  http://ec.europa.eu/invest-in-research/monitoring/knowledge_en.htm 
10  For a comprehensive discussion of ERA’s past actions and future plans, see EC 2009, The European Research Area 
Partnership. 2008 Initiatives. Luxembourg. ERA from the Innovation Perspective: Knowledge Spillovers, Cost of Inventing and Voluntary Cooperation 
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Source: ERA initiatives 2008. 
The implementation of the ERA’s initiatives is based on the concept of a New Partnership between the 
Commission and the Member States in order to strengthen the commitment of member states to 
implement the ERA policy.
11 This so-called 'Ljubljana Process' enhances the political governance of 
the ERA by building links between research and other policies and by setting up the long term vision 
European Research Area Vision 2020 (see Council of the European Union, 2891
st Competitiveness 
Council, 2. December 2008). 
1.4. Conclusions 
The permanent R&D gap in Europe vis-à-vis the USA indicates that the EU level and Member states’ 
research policies have not been effective and sufficient. The long term persistence of European 
research gaps results in a relatively smaller knowledge stock and therefore further weak future 
prospects for research and innovation in Europe and in the individual member states. In the following 
chapter an analytical frame is developed which allows the identification of the economic value of the 
ERA. The link between the ERA and innovation is the business sector R&D and knowledge spillovers. 
2. Analytical framework for research, innovation and knowledge spillovers 
2.1. Competition, research and innovation: driving forces 
It is initially the competition on the product markets and the profit prospective which induces 
innovation (Schumpeter 1942). The business sector R&D reflects the efforts of a firm to increase its 
                                                 
11  The voluntary cooperation between Member states does not necessarily concern all Member states but eventually only a 
group. Member states have establish five ERA groups with the Commission as rapporteur which work out the 
implementation strategies for each individual ERA initiative. The organisation of the ERA groups are different in 
different initiatives. 
1. Towards Joint Programming in Research (EC COM(2008) 468): The aim is to decrease 
fragmentation and to make a better use of Europe’s limited public sector R&D funds through voluntary 
cooperation. In particular, in the areas of common societal challenges (not national priorities) where 
resources need to be pooled for achieving results.  
2. Better Careers and more mobility (EC COM(2008) 317): The aim is to ensure the 
availability and quality of the necessary researchers in partnership with Member states in the areas of 
open recruitment, social security and pensions issues, attractive employment and working conditions 
and issues on right training. 
3. Research Infrastructure (EC COM(2008) 467): The legal framework of European Research 
Infrastructure is designed to facilitate the joint establishment and operation of research facilities of 
European interest between several Member states and associated states. 
4. Sharing knowledge (EC C(2008) 1329): This initiative aims mainly to improve the
management of IPRs in public research organisations, better dissemination of knowledge from 
academic – industry collaboration (licencing, spin-offs) and rules of governance for contract research.  
5. International cooperation (EC COM(2008) 588): Strengthening the partnership between the 
Member states and the EC contributes to stability, security and prosperity in the world and promotes 
European policy goals and European technologies worldwide. Marianne Paasi 
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performance and competitiveness through innovative products.
12 Economic variables and incentives 
determine technological progress, i.e. knowledge is produced by R&D investment (endogenously) and 
it is used as a production factors in the production of knowledge so long there are economic incentives 
to do so (for example Grossman/Helpman 1991, referring to Arrow 1962).  
In particular, the endogenous growth theory was capable of showing how knowledge production 
and the technological spillovers from it to a general knowledge stock can generate long term growth. 
In turn, the knowledge spillovers (from the general stock of knowledge) increase the productivity of 
future R&D investment of firms or reduce their costs which add further to the stock of general 
knowledge (Grossman/Helpman 1991; Romer 1990).
13  
The general equilibrium model shows how both costs of R&D and the rewards for innovation are 
affected by conditions in product, factor and capital markets (Grossman/Helpman 1991). However, a 
substantial empirical and partial analytical literature has shown that knowledge spillovers are an 
important part of firm’s innovation decisions and that they are not automatic.  
Innovation context: consequences for research policy 
In the economic analysis and models very often research and innovation are treated as synonyms 
which however blur important policy and economic incentive issues.
14 In particular, the economic 
policy has strongly focused on the specific characteristics of research, its outputs and their 
consequences on market efficiencies and incentives.
15 Policies have been developed to compensate the 
gap between private and social rate of return (calling for IPR policies, subsidies or joint research 
ventures). Government funding is called for financing the academic/basic research which is assumed 
to have non-rival and non-excludable output.  
In the knowledge based growth theory obviously the knowledge spillovers are so small that they do 
not disturb the incentives to knowledge production while contributing to a general knowledge stock. 
Knowledge sharing out of it does not pose any information or incentives problems or any other types 
of obstacles which are known in the partial-analytical literature. This growth theory points out that for 
innovations also product and factor markets matter but so do types of knowledge and the incentives for 
their spillovers.
16 
The difference between public (“general knowledge stock”) and private knowledge and their weak 
interactions and endogenous nature has been well recognized (David/Dagupta 1994; Foray 2004). In 
the innovation context all knowledge becomes economically valuable knowledge because of the role 
of knowledge for the competition in the product market. In addition, the economics of information 
point out to many important obstacles or inefficiencies in the knowledge market and sharing which 
gives rise to transaction costs also in the knowledge spillovers.  
The unspecified treatment of R&D investment is misleading in the context of research and 
innovation policy because “research” is closer to the invention (as output from knowledge production) 
and D closer to the innovation of a firm (new product on the market). An innovation is accomplished 
                                                 
12  ERA concept does not include other types of intangibles and the so-called non-technological innovations.  
13  Or alternatively long term growth arises from knowledge spillovers from the investment in human capital.  
14  Partly, due to weak data availability and measurement for innovation R&D expenditure (often measured by total R&D 
expenditure) has been taken as synonym for innovation in empirical models. 
15  “Market failures”, i.e. market forces left alone under-invest in research activities result from weak appropriability of 
knowledge outputs, but also from uncertainties and indivisibilities (fixed cost character of R&D activity) in the 
knowledge production (Arrow 1962; Nelson 1959).  
16  While (technological) knowledge spillovers is the basis for the new growth theories, in the technological rivalry of firms 
knowledge is proprietary calling for IPRs. Already Nelson 1982 speaks about a schizophrenia of economics for this 
dichotomy. ERA from the Innovation Perspective: Knowledge Spillovers, Cost of Inventing and Voluntary Cooperation 
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only with the first commercial transaction involving the new products and processes (Stoneman 1983). 
Market conditions matter for the decisions to develop new technologies. 
Further, R&D is untypical investment because circa 50 % of it is wages and salaries of highly 
educated scientists and engineers. In the firms research personnel cannot be easily fired because of the 
tacit knowledge (zero elasticity of substitution with other types of labor) (Hall/Lerner 2009). Tacit 
knowledge embodied in the human capital is an important input factor for knowledge creation and its 
mobility creates knowledge spillovers (see below). 
2.2. Determinants of Business R&D investment  
2.2.1 Supply and demand side determinants for business sector R&D 
Business sector investment in knowledge (R&D activities) is produced due to economic incentives. 
The expected profits of R&D investment depend on the supply and demand factors and they determine 
the level and direction of the investment, i.e. firms’ R&D strategy (Pakes/Schankerman 1987; Nelson 
1982).
17 
The supply of scientific and technological knowledge and opportunities determine the expected 
cost of producing new industrial knowledge, i.e. the cost of inventing (Nelson 1982). The quantity and 
quality of scientific and engineering knowledge differ across industries, technologies and sciences – 
and countries. According to these arguments differences in the cost of producing knowledge across 
industries explains therefore the observed differences in the industrial R&D investment and the rate of 
technical change (Rosenberg 1963, 1969, 1974, Scherer 1965). 
Demand and the size of the market become the main determinants of the business sector R&D 
investment and technical change under elastic supply of new industrial knowledge, i.e. scientific 
knowledge is provided at the same level of costs for all industries (countries). (Schmookler 1966, for 
capital goods). The size of the market for the innovative product is proportional to the expected 
rewards of the business sector R&D investment. Knowledge spillovers from research reduce the 
market size because increased number of competing firms about market shares (Grossman/Helpman 
1991).
18 
It is rather the science which brings radical innovation than a demand pull. Demand side is usually 
determining the incremental innovations rather than radical ones which come from the scientific 
discovery (Gerolski 2003). 
2.2.2. Human resources in the knowledge production
19 
The production of knowledge depends on the availability of human resources for research (researchers 
and engineers), in particular at the technology frontier (see for example Phelps/Nelson 1966; Aghion 
2006). More abundant stock of researchers is related to lower wage and therefore a lower cost of 
inventing. Increase in research and innovation activities requires an increase in the quantity with right 
quality of human capital (researchers, engineers) (Romer 2000). 
                                                 
17  Also relative prices matter, for example factor prices for factor saving technical progress. Policy can use regulations to 
influence relative prices like in supporting environmental innovations.  
18  The market size depends on the IPR which guarantee a temporary monopoly for an innovating firm. Also government 
demand and public procurement policy matter. It can also influence the direction of technical change, i.e. market size for 
a special type of technology. International policy and export markets are critical in particular for small countries. 
19  Another important issue is the availability of finance (risk capital) and problems of asymmetric information in the 
financial markets (leading to a finance gap for R&D, Hall/Lerner 2009). Risk capital is not included in this paper which 
concentrates on knowledge spillovers. Marianne Paasi 
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However, labour markets for researches are imperfect because of intangible character of education 
investment (market failures), various institutional (regulations) conditions but also due to asymmetric 
information. Public sector finances the higher education and research system in many countries, in 
particular in Europe. Supply and demand for human resources does not always match. Therefore it is 
possible that it becomes a bottleneck for business sector R&D investment.  
2.3. Business sector R&D and sources of knowledge: cost of inventing  
Knowledge spillovers for business sector research and the cost of inventing 
Innovation and growth theories recognise that along with technological opportunities (supply of 
knowledge) also knowledge spillovers determine the expected costs of producing new technology. 
Knowledge spillovers are an important input to firms' own research process (business sector R&D) 
increasing its effectiveness and reducing (cost of inventing. Inventing and innovation activities of 
firms utilise today a multiple sources of knowledge which is a different understanding that the linear 
innovation model where innovation was a direct result from and initiated by basic research (Cohen et 
al 2005). 
Industry’s technological opportunities depend on various other sources of extra-industry and intra-
industry knowledge. Such sources for knowledge spillovers are basic academic research and applied 
research, external sources of technological knowledge (like upstream suppliers like materials) or 
down-stream users of industry’s products (Cohen 1996). Recently the relevant range of knowledge and 
information sources has been extended to cover also competitors, customers, suppliers, consultants 
and contracts with R&D firms along with joint ventures and the firm's own manufacturing operations 
(Cohen et al 2005, p.5). International knowledge spillovers are an important source as well (Griliches 
1992; Mohnen 2001; Grossman/Helpman 1991). 
There is a substantial literature on inter-firm, inter-industry and intra-industry knowledge 
spillovers, in particular in the context of spillovers which reduce the incentives to invest in knowledge 
production (see above). The importance and sources of knowledge spillovers differ across industries 
(Cohen et al 2005; Nelson 1982). In the R&D intensive industries the knowledge spillovers can be an 
incentive for R&D investment rather than disincentive (Gerolski 1996). 
In the following we will concentrate on those sources of knowledge spillovers which are relevant 
for two ERA initiatives “Joint programming of publicly funded research” and “Careers and Mobility 
of Researchers” as well as for the demand oriented innovation policy. Therefore, the main focus is on 
the academic research and cross-border, international knowledge spillovers embodied in human 
capital.  
The role of public sector and university research for business sector R&D  
Academic research is rather curiosity driven than profit-driven and the intended outcome of research is 
non-rival and non-excludable (Grossman/Helmann 1991). The output (scientific results and 
researchers) from academic research
20 contribute to the public knowledge stock which provides inputs 
(knowledge spillovers) to the future research activities. This lowers the costs of future technical 
breakthroughs. Therefore, the productivity of business sector and applied public sector research 
activities increases the rates of return of business sector R&D investment, or in other words, the 
knowledge spillovers lower the cost of inventing (David/Dasgupta 1994; Nelson 1982; 
Pakes/Schankerman 1987).  
                                                 
20  Academic research is considered as public good which is financed by the government (ideally by taxes according to the 
economics of public goods literature) and therefore provided free to everybody.  ERA from the Innovation Perspective: Knowledge Spillovers, Cost of Inventing and Voluntary Cooperation 
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Recent academic literature points out that recently the importance of academic research for 
inventing activities has increased in the USA (Cohen et al 2005; Brandstetter et al 2005). Also the 
propensity to conduct (business sector) research abroad seems to be related to a critical mass of quality 
academic research and local scientific networks of university researchers (Belderbos et al 2009). 
Earlier empirical research (Mansfield 1994; Jaffe, A. 1989) has produced the same result that quality 
of academic research (university department), the size and the geographical proximity are the most 
important factors for the industrial research. Firms tend to support applied research in their proximity 
but insist and choose for highest quality of academic research even in other locations.  
Public research institutes and universities are also the source of research skills for the skilled-biased 
innovations and technological progress and for a sufficient supply of researchers for research and for 
the business sector research (Cohen et al 2005). For guaranteeing the highest quality also adequate 
incentive systems for research professionals are needed. However, as basic research does not compete 
through the product market like the business sector R&D duplication and quality problems exist 
(Pavitt 1998; Grossman/Helpman 1991).  
International diffusion and spillovers 
Analogous to other (public sector; general knowledge stock) knowledge spillovers, international 
knowledge spillovers can play an important role for the growth dynamism. In particular, integrated or 
open economies can utilize these sources of knowledge spillovers for example international mobility 
of researchers, R&D cooperation or scientific publications that is empirically quite well demonstrated 
(Mohnen 2001; Coe/Helpman 1995; Aghion/Howitt 2009).  
Demand and customers as source of knowledge 
The recent (demand led) innovation theories pays more attention to the interaction between lead users 
and innovators (innovation communities). They are the source of information concerning needs and 
solutions which support the design of innovative products and services.  
2.4. Obstacles to Knowledge spillovers 
In the new growth theory knowledge spillovers are the driver of growth but a look at the real world 
reveals that they are not taking place automatically or without efforts. The issues about lags and the 
intra-national or global scope of knowledge spillovers are particularly important to growth and trade 
policy (Grossman/Helpman 1991). Intra-national spillovers (national component of the knowledge 
stock) lead to reinforcing comparative advantages, global spillovers lead to the validity of traditional 
trade theory.  
Certain types of spillovers take place more or less automatically (although not necessarily without 
cost) due to embodedness in goods or codified in publications. However, there is a range of reasons 
why spillovers are not immediate and tend to stay local.
21 One type of obstacles to global and 
immediate knowledge spillovers is the existence of cost of exploitation (efforts, investment) which 
depends on various parameters (absorptive capacity, technological distance). Another type of obstacles 
lies in the characteristics of knowledge and information themselves which influence the incentives of 
knowledge sharing, inefficient markets and needs for institutions because transaction costs occur. 
Knowledge spillovers are endogenous and costly: role of absorptive capacities 
Capturing knowledge spillovers requires efforts which depend on costs and benefits. The large the 
technological distance and lower the absorptive capacities, the weaker the knowledge spillover. In 
                                                 
21  There is a rich literature on regional knowledge spillovers as well as the New Regional Development Theory. Marianne Paasi 
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particular, the in-house R&D efforts and education build up the necessary absorptive capacity to 
exploit externally created knowledge (Cohen, W./Levinthal, D. 1990). Therefore, for countries at 
lower technological level the higher education (the absorptive capacities) and capabilities for 
experimental use of new instruments requires the capacity to conduct basic research.  
Systemic differences in incentive for knowledge sharing: science - industry 
A real challenge for policy maker is to design the science – industry interactions (David/Dasgupta 
1994, 510) which do not occur automatically because knowledge disclosure depends on different 
incentives, organisations and norms in the academic and industrial research systems and institutions.
22 
The types of research are not determined by the location of their production but are endogenous. The 
input of the knowledge from basic research in the context of product market competition means that its 
use by rivals (reduction of the expected costs of inventing) the profit opportunities (Witt 2007; 
Grossman/Helpman 1991), i.e. basic research is not non-rival in this context.  
Incentives to knowledge sharing: role transaction costs  
Exchange and sharing of economically valuable knowledge are bound to important constraints because 
of its specific characteristics and asymmetric information (between seller and buyer, see Akerlof 1970 
Lemon’s problem). Arrow’s paradox (Arrow 1962) describes the situation: if the potential buyer does 
not know content of the information, he cannot appreciate its value. When he does know it, he does 
not need to buy it anymore. There is an uncertainty about the (future) economic value of the 
knowledge and it is not clear what the risks of the transaction are. The market imperfections give raise 
to so-called transaction costs which are necessary for the transaction to take place (Williamson 1975).  
The transaction costs are particularly large with exchange of knowledge and information. 
Uncertainty and asymmetric information is the normal situation leading to moral hazard and adverse 
selection. Further there is the possibility of opportunistic behaviour of the partners (Durth 2001, p. 
307). This situation brings high costs to sharing of knowledge and in the worst case prevents the 
sharing and spillovers of knowledge. Role of policy is therefore to support the transactions concerning 
knowledge (trust, contracts, coordination).  
Human resources and knowledge spillovers 
Human capital is the carrier of tacit knowledge and therefore the mobility of researchers (with tacit 
knowledge) is one of the most important means of knowledge spillovers across sectors, industries and 
countries. Mobility is however slowed down due to differences in incentive systems, to information, 
search and mobility cost, asymmetric information and in cross-country context due to national 
regulations.  
Additional obstacles to international diffusion  
International knowledge spillovers are usually assumed have additional barriers like language, 
geographical distance or differences in (science) institutions which increase the information and search 
costs and would explain slower knowledge diffusion. However, these obstacles might not be that 
serious if firms (even with higher search and information costs) – as already indicated – look for the 
best and most excellence academic research results and for R&D cooperation regardless of the 
distance or nationality (see above). International context nevertheless is likely to create higher 
transaction costs because institutional differences and different languages may weaken the trust 
relationships between the partners.  
                                                 
22  This argument is in line with the so-called systemic failure in the knowledge system which prevents important 
interactions (and learning and diffusion) between knowledge producing actors of different knowledge types and sub-
systems (Nelson/Winter 1977). ERA from the Innovation Perspective: Knowledge Spillovers, Cost of Inventing and Voluntary Cooperation 
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Knowledge spillovers from customers (markets) 
Customers are an important source of knowledge with respect of needs and solutions which give 
orientations to the firms' R&D investment. However, the need information and solution information 
are sticky and there is the problem of asymmetry (Akerlof’s Lemon problem) (von Hippel, E. 2006). 
However, the place of this type knowledge source still needs to be in integrated in the context of the 
endogenous growth theory while it is relatively easy to see as knowledge source which reduces cost of 
inventing. Simultaneously customer information influences demand side for business sector R&D.  
2.5. Conclusions 
Knowledge spillovers from business sector R&D investment or other sources of knowledge 
accumulate the general knowledge stock which allows higher productivity in the future scientific and 
technological research activities. In the innovation perspective the (inward) knowledge spillovers 
reduce the cost of inventing (more efficient business sector R&D investment). As profits of business 
sector R&D investment are directly proportional with the size of the market outward knowledge 
spillovers to competitors reduce the market size and rewards to business sector R&D.  
Various types of obstacles to knowledge spillovers tend to make knowledge to an intra-national 
asset. This has strong implications (arguments initially developed for trade policy) for research and 
innovation policy, in particular for European research policy. A policy which aims to support 
circulation of knowledge has to consider the delicate balance between the incentives for production of 
knowledge and for knowledge spillovers in Europe. From the point of view of economic policy a 
serious issues is that certain knowledge spillovers can become intra-national because of a complex 
system of interacting incentives and other obstacles. 
3. European Research Area (ERA) policy and knowledge spillovers  
3.1. The economic value of ERA: knowledge spillovers and the cost of inventing 
Applying the above theoretical framework(s) this chapter will analyse through which mechanisms 
ERA and its individual Initiatives can influence the circulation of knowledge, technology and 
researchers, how this influences the business sector R&D investment in Europe and what are the 
Member states incentives for voluntary cooperation in the context of European multi-level research 
policy. 
Applying the knowledge based growth theory the permanent research and innovation gap lowers 
the relative knowledge stock in Europe and the incentives for future innovation efforts which in turn 
generates fewer knowledge spillovers into the general stock of knowledge. It can be argued that the 
fragmentation of European research system creates barriers to the circulation of knowledge, weak 
competition and lack of critical mass. This results in separate national knowledge stocks which are 
both too low in quantity and too low in quality of scientific research relative to its own potential and 
relative to the competitor USA.  
The low quantity and quality of the scientific and technological knowledge stock negatively 
influences the cost of inventing, the business sector R&D investment and capacity to create new 
technologies in Europe. The cost of inventing is too high even within each Member state which 
exploits mainly its intra-national knowledge pools and human resources. Even those member states 
which do not have a research and innovation gap relative to the USA
23 suffer if they cannot exploit a 
                                                 
23  The fragmentation of European research systems seems not to be a problem for the research and innovation performance 
in some Member states (at least until now). Marianne Paasi 
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large and high quality European knowledge pool as a result of their innovation efforts. This is the case 
if the knowledge spillovers are local due to various barriers as indicated in the theoretical discussion 
and cannot be substituted by other sources. Business sector R&D goes to where the best research takes 
place because high quality science is essential for technological breakthroughs (Bonaccosi 2007; 
Gerolski 2003; Brandstetter 2005; Mansfield 1994; Jaffe 1989). In this context China’s extremely high 
growth rates of R&D with high absolute amounts can influence the business sector R&D decisions in 
Europe.  
Therefore, the role of the ERA initiatives is to increase the circulation of knowledge (growing, 
larger and producing a more efficient knowledge pool) and to underpin stronger competition and better 
conditions for knowledge production which will make the national and European business sector R&D 
investment more efficient and will lower the cost of inventing in Europe. When the ERA can create 
favourable conditions (growing knowledge stock) higher business sector R&D investment in Europe 
will be possible if the demand is growing simultaneously.  
While the rationals for a demand-led innovation policy at the EU level may be difficult to argue 
theoretically including a demand and market perspective in the European research policy makes sense. 
Markets for the products and services incorporating new knowledge are fragmented in Europe due to 
national IPR systems and regulations but also due to asymmetric information and search costs. Yet, 
the market size determines directly the expected rewards of business sector R&D investment which is 
important to compensate the disincentives from increased knowledge spillovers. The EU level is 
responsible for policies which influence the size and dynamism of European product and service 
markets (see below). 
3.2. ERA knowledge spillovers and economics of voluntary cooperation  
We have identified the economic value of ERA, i.e. the reduced cost of inventing but capturing this 
benefit in the member states comes only through implementation of the ERA initiatives. ERA and its 
initiatives operate on the basis of voluntary cooperation between member states or from voluntary 
adjustments of their national institutions in partnership with the Commission. In the European research 
policy context there is no legal framework to force contracts or policies at the member state level.
24 
We now need to turn to the issue of incentives for voluntary cooperation which is the policy making 
model of the ERA policy and its initiatives.  
The Member states are invited to reduce the inefficiency of European research by implementing the 
ERA initiatives which theoretically provide benefits at the EU level (in terms of efficiency and 
reduced costs of inventing). Yet, it is essential to show that an individual member state gets – at least 
in theory – can capture an additional benefit from the ERA knowledge spillovers through reduced 
costs of future technological breakthroughs. This is critical because the ERA initiatives influence the 
competitiveness of national industries and involve important political and legal aspects such as 
government funding (from tax payers money) for national public goods (education, basic research).
25  
Theoretically, the greatest benefits from ERA and its initiatives come when possibly high number 
(all) of the Member States participates in the initiatives. However, there are several reasons why the 
incentives for Member States of voluntary cooperation in European research policy are rather weak.  
Firstly, research and innovation belong to the national competitiveness strategies of the Member 
states whose industries compete with each others at the European and international markets. In the 
context of competition in the product markets all – also from basic research - knowledge spillovers 
become rivals. Therefore, from the point of view of an individual member state basic research is 
                                                 
24  However, the FTEU has been reinforced the role of EU level in coordinating research policies.  
25  Also the national legal framework can prevent to use Member States’ own financial funds (tax payers money) for 
international cooperation but this is a legal issue rather than an issue about economic incentives.  ERA from the Innovation Perspective: Knowledge Spillovers, Cost of Inventing and Voluntary Cooperation 
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economically valuable knowledge which is financed from the national budget. The incentives for 
knowledge spillovers from the national public goods have probably a intra-national tendency. The 
Member States have weak incentives to produce European public goods from national funds (where 
also the free riding problem exists). 
Secondly, the nature of knowledge and information has important consequences for the functioning 
of markets and institutions (due to asymmetric information issues) leading to transaction costs and 
other problems. Due to the characteristics of knowledge the benefits from cooperation are not clear 
(asymmetric information, quality (lemons) problem leading to inefficient markets). In this situation, a 
member state cannot assess a priori what it gets in return from its own efforts.  
Thirdly, while the advantage cannot be assessed thus making impossible to assess the reduced cost 
of inventing, the necessary own efforts for capturing knowledge spillovers reduce their scope. The 
participants need to be convinced that the benefits are higher than the costs. These potential benefits 
and their conditionality can influence the incentives for voluntary cooperation of the Member States in 
the individual ERA initiatives. Such costs of spillovers may depend on geographical proximity but 
specially depend on the technological distance (quality of knowledge) and absorptive capacity.  
The heterogeneity of member states in terms of size, technological level and absorptive capacity is 
an important determinant for the voluntary cooperation and choice of partners. Incentives to cooperate 
seem to be rather weak and in particular large and technology frontier countries being self-sufficient 
have fewer incentives to cooperate on ERA initiatives (Marimon/Graca Carvalho 2008a). In addition, 
it needs to be taken into account that the individual ERA initiatives have different mechanisms for 
supporting knowledge spillovers in Europe and each of them faces a variety of specific obstacles. We 
now turn to analysing the incentives for implementing Joint Programming and Better Careers and 
Mobility. 
3.3. ERA initiatives and the incentives for voluntary cooperation
26 
3.3.1. Towards Joint Programming in publicly funded research  
The ERA initiative “Joint Programming” in publicly funded research between a group of volunteer 
member states with the possible participation of the EU is justified due to the increase in the critical 
mass (economies of scale in R&D activities; reduces duplication). National funds should be pooled 
and research programmes and calls organised jointly together while the Commission may provide 
financial input. The final results are envisaged into be transformed to innovation (EC 2008).
27  
Joint programming is important because in contrast to the business sector R&D for which 
competition on the product markets abolishes duplication and leads to low quality research (Pavitt 
1998; Grossman/Helpman 1991) public sector research activities are not open to European or 
international competition.
28 It is probable that the European public sector research involves duplication 
of effort and lower scientific quality (than the USA). The rationale for joint programming is therefore 
not primarily the aspect of critical mass and reduction of duplication for stronger economies of scale 
but increasing the degree of competition and higher scientific quality. 
                                                 
26  The individual analysis does not cover the ERA initiatives on Research Infrastructure, Knowledge sharing and 
International cooperation.  
27  The Europe 2020 Strategy foresees that Joint Programming could take place in the areas of major environmental and 
societal challenges in Europe. 
28  Research outputs and researchers from basic research however do compete at the world academic markets according to 
the reputational system. Marianne Paasi 
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Joint Programming can reduce the cost of inventing in Europe which is higher than in the USA. 
And the cost of inventing also differs in each individual member state. However, in the innovation 
context also basic research constitutes economically useful knowledge (it is rival) and it matters who 
gets the benefits (reduced cost of inventing). Knowledge spillovers reduce own (industry’s) profit 
opportunities (Witt 2007; d’Aspremont/Jacquemin 1988).
29 Who gets the economic benefits from joint 
programming is not clear a priori. 
In this context, it is useful to apply the literature on joint research venture between firms where the 
R&D cooperation is the means to internalise externalities (knowledge spillovers). The benefits arise 
due to risk sharing, knowledge sharing, minimising transaction costs, economies of scale (among 
others Cassiman 2009; d’Aspremont/Jacquemin 1988; Wiethaus 2006).
30 The R&D cooperation 
literature informs us also about several reasons for weak incentives towards joint R&D activities like 
technical and incentive obstacles such as additional costs (transaction costs), knowledge disclosure is 
not perfect, the benefits are unclear with asymmetric partners and spillovers require efforts (see 
Chapter 3).  
A two stage model of R&D cooperation provides us with clearer insights about these types of 
problems. In the two stage model of R&D cooperation
31 research efforts in basic and developmental 
research are conducted independently. Due to strategic issues on both sides the sharing of knowledge 
in the (basic) research phase creates an adverse selection problem and in the developmental phase a 
moral hazard problem. Therefore, there is an interaction between moral hazard and adverse selection 
problem. In particular, if the quality of knowledge differs and all knowledge levels are shared then 
only the most knowledgeable agents’s knowledge is useful to the technology for efficient development 
effort at the subsequent stages (D’Apremont et al 1998). This means a strong free riding element and 
in the context of joint programming this indicates that (basic) research cooperation between 
qualitatively unequal partners becomes impossible (moral hazard, adverse selection, free riding, 
transaction costs, contracts, see in particular Silipo, D. 2008; Cassiman 2009; Durth 2001).
32 
Research outputs (even from basic research) are not simply information and recently it has been 
shown that when the knowledge spillover are costly (need absorptive capacities) and endogenous the 
incentives for R&D cooperation are reduced (Wiethaus 2006). It is also difficult to see how profit 
sharing (benefits) takes place in a country context, also because the costs of transforming the results 
from (joint) basic research to (national) innovations (national benefits or incentives) differ and are 
uncertain. Therefore, the theory of contracts could provide important insights to these problems.  
3.3.2. The Better Careers and Mobility Initiative 
The initiative Better Careers and More Mobility aims to ensure the availability and high quality of 
researchers (freedom of knowledge) in partnership with Member states in Europe. The initiative 
includes issues on right training, attractive careers and removal of barriers to mobility including open 
recruitment (in the public sector) and portability of grants, social security with supplementary pension 
                                                 
29  How to analyse the incentives for R&D cooperation between basic research institutions depends on the underlying 
assumption about its characteristics. Assuming that basic research in an individual member state had the pure public 
goods characteristics leading to free riding and underinvestment in Europe. Then the policy issue would be that basic 
research has a too low level in Europe, and it should be provide by a EU level organisation at world level competition and 
financed by the EU budget (as discussed by Sapir et al 2002; Pisani-Ferry/Sapir 2005).  
30  There is a large literature on joint research ventures usually focusing on impact of JRVs on R&D investment, welfare 
effects and consequences for competition. For an review in the European context, see for example Hagerdoorn et al 2000. 
31  Results from the Joint Programming initiative are expected to contribute into innovations.  
32 Important  stability  conditions for cooperation exist and have been worked out for firms’ cooperation (see Cassiman 2009) 
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schemes and attractive working conditions. It is also linked to the Bologna process of reforming on 
higher education in Europe.
33 
Insufficient availability of researchers in Europe is a combined result of ageing, weak attractiveness 
for foreigners and low entry points in researcher careers. In addition, the USA attracts a considerable 
number of – probably the best - European researchers. The lack of a European labour market for 
researchers leads to mismatches (due to information costs for example) between demand and supply 
across Europe preventing effective use of the human capital stock in European research. Increases in 
R&D activities result in increase of wages rather than higher employment of researchers if additional 
human resources cannot be found. There is no competition based recruitment in the public sector 
preventing mobility and healthy scientific competition. 
Theoretically, this situation poses an obstacle to the business sector and to the public sector 
research activities and reduces the knowledge spillovers across Europe which arises from the mobility 
of tacit knowledge embodied in human capital. Human capital and its quality being the main factor of 
production for research the cost of inventing increases across individual member states’ industry. In 
particular, mobility of researchers goes together with higher competition and associated institutional 
reforms in Europe (Marimon/Garcia Carvalho 2008a; Marimon/Garcia Carvalho 2008b; Aghion et al 
2007). Scientific quality increases importantly.  
However, from the point of view of a member state strong mobility is problematic because higher 
education is to a large degreefinanced by government budgets in expectation of mainly local use of 
human resources. It is also not without cost to attract researchers from other locations and introducting 
more competition across own institutions will create resistance (as described in Banchoff 2002). The 
balance and quality between the inward and outward flows of human capital is unknown a priori. 
Uncertainty about the benefits also weakens the willingness for necessary reforms. 
With more openness public investment in higher education and universities might be reduce d 
because knowledge spillovers attract “free riding” with other regions or countries educational 
investment rather than financing from national budgets (national public goods) EU level public goods. 
However, better opportunities for mobility increase the private rates of returns to education investment 
and the incentives to invest privately in education; in particular, high mobility disciplines (Poutvaara 
2005). 
4. Supporting voluntary cooperation and reforms for ERA 
The above analysis shows that ERA policy and the two selected initiatives provide potential economic 
benefits in terms of reduced cost of inventing, higher scientific quality and under certain conditions of 
increased business sector R&D in Europe. The benefits arise however only if the Member states apply 
the ERA initiatives.  
Considering the potential benefits for innovation in Europe this raises the question of how the EU 
level policies could support the incentives for voluntary cooperation in all Member states. In the 
following we will discuss various EU level policy options which can support implementation of the 
ERA (Joint Programming and Better careers and Mobility) initiatives. 
4.1. Financial compensation: limited effectiveness  
Both the Joint Programming and Better Careers and Mobility initiatives face various types of obstacle 
and incentives which prevent voluntary cooperation and therefore knowledge sharing and spillovers. 
In the case of Joint Programming the R&D cooperation literature points out issues like asymmetric 
                                                 
33  The need to have sufficient human resources for R&D in Europe has been visible since before the launch of the Lisbon 
Strategy 2000. Several initiatives have been launched (mobility and careers; code of conduct; pension rights).  Marianne Paasi 
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partners and inefficiency problems from asymmetric information
34 while the ERA initiative Better 
Careers and Mobility faces obstacles due to national financing of higher education and the difficulty to 
introduce reforms in the national science systems.  
The FP7 already gives financial incentives for European R&D cooperation between various 
research partners and organisations in Europe and compensates transaction and coordination costs 
(management of projects).
35 However, the management of the Framework programme is too heavy and 
complex and it takes too long to establish a contract. Therefore, the costs of project management are 
eventually higher than the benefits. This calls for the simplification of EU legal environment of 
complex rules with heavy management procedures.  
Yet, there are even more serious issues concerning economic incentives and it is really difficult to 
see how financial compensation could work in practice to support joint programming. When partners 
are asymmetric (due to size or technological level) obstacles for voluntary cooperation arise because 
the inputs and benefits (knowledge spillovers) are not at equal levels both absolutely and relatively. 
Theoretically one could envisage that the EU level research policy may include instruments which try 
to improve cooperation between countries with same scientific quality (small and large for example). 
However, financial support can never compensate for differences in scientific quality.
36 
Secondly, the ERA’s objective to support researchers’ careers and mobility can reduce the member 
states’ (public funding) incentives to invest in higher education and research in the universities if the 
local availability and knowledge spillovers weakens. An important free riding problem can emerge at 
the EU level even if private incentives to education investment in high mobility disciplines probably 
increase. If human capital becomes a European public good as the result of permanent higher mobility, 
the EU level might need to compensate the nationally reduced investment in higher education and 
universities with internationally competitive transnational research institutions and European level 
education.
37 
This type of additional financial instruments and compensations would increase the absolute size or 
relative share of research and education in the EU budget. The already existing demand to reduce the 
share of Common Agricultural Policy is still valid. This is difficult to achieve politically but a more 
serious problem is the effect of financial compensation on the incentives to the member states. Like 
the present policy of financial compensation for R&D cooperation through the FP has also sent wrong 
incentives for the member states. In some member states the FP is seen as substitute rather than 
complement to national research creating its own interest groups (Banchoff 2002). It also has been 
accompanied by the very harmful "Juste retour" thinking for European innovation dynamism.  
4.2. Competitive and open science systems: higher academic quality 
A more effective ERA policy is to apply the ERA initiatives to open up the national science systems. 
Competition and openness rather than financial incentives bring the necessary quality increase in all 
member states and at all levels (Marimon/Graca 2008a, 2008b; Bonaccio 2007). The academic 
literature has already recognised that opening up and introduction of more competition into the 
European science through institutional reforms is urgently needed in order to improve the quality of 
                                                 
34  Costs and need for absorptive capacity for knowledge spillovers does not really call for EU level measures. However, the 
member states could use the Structural Funds themselves.  
35  Various types of funding schemes exist for supporting European R&D cooperation between private and public research 
conducted by firms, universities, research organisations.  
36  However, there are some examples about Joint Programming in environmental and societal challenges (SET-Plan and 
Alzheimer cooperation project) which can give insights about the conditions to cooperate successfully.  
37  The FP already includes important programmes and instruments such as Marie Curie Programme (People) whose aim is 
temporary mobility of researchers. It supports financially the mobility of excellent researchers in Europe and in the world 
as well as their return to the home base. ERA from the Innovation Perspective: Knowledge Spillovers, Cost of Inventing and Voluntary Cooperation 
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research in Europe (Bonaccio 2007; Marimon/Graca 2008a; Marimon/Graca 2008b “Open, integrated 
and competitive ERA”; Aghion et al 2007 on university reforms; also EC, Better Careers and More 
Mobility, COM (2008) 317 final). 
This need is reinforced in the innovation context because the quality of research, researchers and 
their mobility determine the cost of inventing (directly in the knowledge production and through 
knowledge spillovers). The highest academic excellence of research and of human capital is essential 
for the business sector R&D decisions. In particular, today, business sector R&D decisions are mostly 
internationally oriented and try to find the best knowledge sources worldwide. The overall 
improvement of scientific quality in Europe can be seen as a sort of externality to the European 
innovation activities. 
The implementation of ERA initiatives "Joint Programming" and "Better Careers and Mobility" 
require (voluntary) institutional reforms in the public research sector and universities but reforms are 
costly and face resistance (Banchoff 2002; Marimon/Graca Carvalho 2008). However, overall mutual 
opening up has the highest competition effects and creates new opportunities to the participants from 
all countries. If for example all European universities had a rule of mobility then it is more probably 
that all benefit when they compete about the best researchers (with grants). Also the portability of 
ERC grants (from the FP and therefore EU budget) has increased competition and increased the efforts 
of universities to be an attractive research location. 
Also Joint Programming should be seen as an instrument to increase competition, openness and 
therefore the quality of European basic research rather than creating a (quantitative) critical mass. The 
more countries participate the more there are new opportunities. The management model need to be 
focused on quality guaranteeing tasks at all levels from organising joint calls to evaluations (for 
example in using ERC as a model). The member states would benefit the most if their national funding 
agencies and competition rules always respect certain quality improving guidelines which at the end 
will support all European regions (Marimon/Gracia 2008b). In particular, the goal of excellence need 
to be connected to R&D structural funds, otherwise capacities and quality will never be built up 
(Marimon/Graca Carvalho 2008a). 
4.3. Expanding demand and markets: compensating knowledge spillovers 
ERA policy and its initiatives focus on the supply of knowledge, in particular on knowledge 
accumulation and spillovers including human capital. Yet, the potential benefits from knowledge 
spillovers and reduced the cost of inventions depend also how the demand for products or services 
integrating knowledge develops. Knowledge spillovers – even from public research – benefit also the 
competitors that is equivalent to decreasing market size and shares and therefore the expected profits.
38 
Indeed, the relative low share of researchers in the European industry (in comparison to the USA) 
indicates that rather demand than supply is the limiting factor. 
Therefore all EU level policies which reduce fragmentation and support dynamism of markets for 
innovative products belong to the European research and innovation policy.
39,
40 They include issues 
like the European Union patent, internal market (regulations, standards, directives), public 
procurement and Lead Market Initiative (user information)which support the incentives for voluntary 
implementation of ERA. In particular, innovative ideas are embodied in products and services with 
high income elasticity indicating that access to fast growing, large markets is crucial. Such market 
                                                 
38  The aspect of rivalry on the product markets has important impacts on the incentives for knowledge spillovers and 
knowledge sharing.  
39  FTEU Art. 179 (2) includes the internal market and public procurement.  
40  For example the low share of researchers in the business sector labour force indicates that the business sector’s demand 
for human capital matters along with institutional barriers on scientists’ labour market and scientific institutions in 
Europe. Marianne Paasi 
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conditions are presently more likely to be found outside of Europe pointing out the importance of the 
EU level efforts on WTO agreements, including trade related aspects of intellectual property rights 
(TRIPs). 
Lisbon type of structural policies in the Member state (removing institutional barriers to structural 
change; Encaoua 2009) together with policies on supporting take up of new activities (new innovative 
firms, conditions to take-ups, SMEs, access to markets) support equally the demand for knowledge 
functioning as carriers of knowledge diffusion.  
5. Conclusions for European research and innovation policies  
The innovation and business sector R&D perspective helps in identifying the economic value of the 
ERA policy, i.e. reducing cost of inventing in Europe. It is also the innovation context which reveals 
more clearly why the incentives of the Member States for voluntary cooperation in implementing the 
two ERA initiatives are rather weak.  
ERA policy and EU level research and innovation policy have not yet addressed the importance of 
incentives and obstacles to knowledge spillovers. Nor has the underlying growth theory taken into 
account the obstacles to the knowledge spillovers which block this source of long term growth. The 
insights from partial analytical and empirical literature need to be integrated into the endogenous 
growth theory. These obstacles make tendencially the knowledge spillovers intra-national. More 
academic research is needed on the incentives for producing and sharing knowledge and the role of 
markets on the relationship between knowledge spillovers and business sector R&D in the growth 
context. 
Furthermore, the obstacles to ERA knowledge spillovers have multiple sources and they interact. 
This makes the design of economic policy is very difficult. The traditional EU level research policy is 
based on the financial compensation of additional costs in the European R&D cooperation. It has 
however only limited effectiveness or even creates counter productive incentives (juste retour 
strategies). A stronger EU level of financing of basic research and higher education would reinforce 
the already old and valid request to increase knowledge investment by reducing the share of the 
Community Agricultural Policy – a difficult political task. 
It was seen that the principal problem is the low competition in publicly funded research and 
education in comparison to that of the business sector where competition on the market eliminates low 
quality of research. Therefore, all countries, including those with lower technological levels can use 
the ERA initiative to open up their (publicly funded) research institutions and universities to inter-
European competition and openness. Already a mutual opening universities for foreign (other national 
universities and European) researchers and introducing mobility periods for own staff would increase 
scientific competition. The higher the degree of mutual opening, the more opportunities are created. 
Probably new management models which implement the openness and completion through ERA 
initiatives are needed. Also the structural funds can be used to reinforce openness and competition.  
The accelerated knowledge spillovers (from nationally funded research and higher education) 
reduce also the cost of inventing of competitors and reduce (even from publicly financed research) the 
market size of domestic firms when they benefit the competitor. Therefore, policies which increase the 
market size and dynamism are essential. The demand oriented research and innovation policy include 
issues like IPR with European dimensions, public procurement, internal market and trade policy; in 
particular it is important to guarantee the access to dynamic world markets. 
ERA policy and its initiatives have the potential to reduce the cost of inventing in Europe which 
could reverse the persistent research and innovation gap in Europe. This gap and the rather intra-
national knowledge spillovers also harm the individual member states’ innovation performances. ERA from the Innovation Perspective: Knowledge Spillovers, Cost of Inventing and Voluntary Cooperation 
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Consequently, the national research and innovation policies need to integrate the ERA dimension in 
terms of competition and openness.  
The above analysis of the ERA’s contribution to innovation and the inherent obstacles to voluntary 
cooperation provide important information to the design of President Barroso’s political program 
“Europe 2020” which orientates towards common European societal, economic and environmental 
challenges. Further this analytical approach also helps to see ERA’s link to innovation – with the 
complementary demand side measures – and to the 3% objective and directly to the target of ¾ 
coming directly from the business sector.  Marianne Paasi 
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